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# Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

## I. Introduction

1. On 4 August 2000, the Security Council adopted resolution 1313 (2000), by which it extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) until 8 September. In that resolution the Council expressed its intention to strengthen the mandate of UNAMSIL as established in its resolutions 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999 and 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000 with a number of priority tasks. The Council also considered that the military component of UNAMSIL should be reinforced, inter alia, through the provision of a strengthened force reserve and requested me to submit, after consultations with troop-contributing countries, a report on the proposals contained in resolution 1313 (2000) with recommendations to restructure and strengthen UNAMSIL.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request. It contains a description of the tasks that would be required of UNAMSIL in the environment prevailing in Sierra Leone, its concept of operations and the necessary resources.

## II. Mandate and tasks

3. In its resolution 1313 (2000) the Security Council observed that the widespread and serious violations of the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/1999/777, annex) by members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) since early May 2000 constituted a breakdown of the prior generally permissive environment, which was based on the Agreement and predicated on the cooperation of the parties. The Council also noted that there would continue to be a threat to UNAMSIL and to the security of the State of Sierra Leone until security conditions had been established that would allow progress towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone. In order to counter that threat, the Council noted that the structure, capability, resources and mandate of UNAMSIL required appropriate strengthening.

4. In this regard, the Security Council indicated its intention to strengthen the Mission's current mandate with a number of priority tasks. Accordingly, the main elements of the Mission's mandated tasks would be:

(a) To maintain the security of the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas and their major approach routes;

(b) To deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force;

(c) To deploy progressively in a coherent operational structure and in sufficient numbers and density at key strategic locations and main population centres;

(d) To assist, in coordination with the Government of Sierra Leone, through the presence of UNAMSIL and within the framework of its mandate, the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend State authority, restore law and order and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country;

(e) Within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under threat of imminent physical violence;

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(f) To patrol actively on strategic lines of communication, specifically main access routes to the capital, in order to dominate ground, ensure freedom of movement and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

(g) To assist in the promotion of the political process leading to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme where possible.

5. In addition, UNAMSIL may be required to provide assistance and support to the special court in Sierra Leone to be set up on the basis of negotiations and consultations with the Government of Sierra Leone, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August.

6. It is understood that UNAMSIL, through its deployment, would be expected to continue to play a key role in supporting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the disposal of weapons.

## III. Overall security environment

7. In reviewing the resources required by UNAMSIL to implement the above-mentioned tasks, due account should be taken of the precarious security environment in which it has to operate, the continued threat posed by RUF and the regional dimension of the conflict. In addition, it should be emphasized that Sierra Leone's infrastructure, especially in the areas under RUF control, has suffered tremendous damage. Many roads have been damaged during hostilities, deliberately cratered by RUF or washed away by torrential rains. Consequently, movement in various areas of Sierra Leone is slow and, in many instances, any resupply of regular military units can be provided only by air, primarily by helicopters. The dense vegetation on the sides of the roads is favourable to guerrilla forces wishing to ambush military and civilian traffic. Sierra Leone's jungle also provides a natural hiding place and cover for concealed movement by guerrilla forces.

8. RUF is believed to have a strength of several thousand fighters. It is relatively well-equipped and, in spite of divisions between some groups, maintains a relatively well-established system of command and control.

9. At the same time, many members of the rank and file of RUF have been forcibly recruited into the guerrilla movement and, presumably, could be persuaded to come forward to disarm, given the proper incentives. Indeed, there have been some indications recently that some fighters may want to leave the ranks of RUF and disarm.

10. However, it may be more difficult to persuade RUF commanders at various levels to abandon their current posture, especially since some of them fear that they can be prosecuted for crimes committed during the conflict. Those commanders, who often exercise control over their fighters through violence, may try to maintain control over their areas for as long as they can. Accordingly, the possibility of coordinated offensives by RUF, in addition to ambushes, kidnapping and acts of banditry, must be taken very seriously. There are indications that RUF continues its forcible recruitment of new fighters and that it is regrouping and rearming with assistance from abroad. On 21 August RUF announced that it had designated Issa Sesay as its interim leader to replace Foday Sankoh, following intensive diplomatic efforts by leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The threat by RUF against the general population, government forces and UNAMSIL remains real and should not be underestimated.

11. The forces fighting on the side of the Government, mainly the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Civil Defence Force (CDF), are still in the process of training and consolidating their presence. Although pro-Government forces have made some progress, they continue to experience problems relating to command and control and logistical support. It remains essential that, in their operations, all pro-Government forces coordinate closely with UNAMSIL.

12. While the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is providing extremely valuable training to the new SLA, it is clear that it will take time and resources before the Government can rely on a security force capable of providing an effective presence throughout the country. The first batch of SLA soldiers trained by the United Kingdom completed a six-week programme on 22 July, and a second group is now undergoing training. According to current plans, the army will ultimately have a strength of about 8,500 troops organized to form 3 operational brigades. For the time being, however, the main burden of establishing and maintaining a credible security

presence in Sierra Leone rests with the international community.

## IV. Concept of operations

### Current deployment and priorities

13. UNAMSIL is currently deployed on the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas and at Lungi Loi, Port Loko, Rogberi Junction, Rokel Bridge, Masiaka, Magbuntoso and Hastings (see map attached). It is also deployed at Moyamba, Mile 91, Bo, Kenema, Joru and Daru. Its military strength, as at 22 August, stands at 12,443 (see annex).

14. At present, the most urgent tasks for UNAMSIL are restructuring the Force, strengthening the Force headquarters, fully equipping its infantry battalions and strengthening deployment at areas close to RUF positions, to the extent that its present authorized strength of 13,000 military personnel allows. The Force has recently deployed a battalion to Mile 91 and has consolidated its presence at Bo and Rogberi. As soon as an additional battalion in UNAMSIL becomes fully operational, it will be deployed to strengthen the protection of access to Port Loko and Masiaka.

### Main objectives

15. As mentioned in paragraph 4 above, in accordance with resolution 1313 (2000), the main objectives of UNAMSIL would be to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend State authority, restore law and order and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country and to assist in the promotion of the political process, leading to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme where possible.

16. In addition to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all combatants, the key elements of a political process towards durable peace in Sierra Leone, as indicated in my previous reports, include the restoration of civil authority throughout the country, the establishment and/or strengthening of national institutions, including democratically accountable armed forces and a national police force, free and fair elections, national reconciliation and respect for human rights and provision of emergency relief assistance.

17. These goals cannot be achieved through the deployment of a peacekeeping force alone. The main focus of the international community's efforts should therefore be on strong political efforts towards a durable peace in Sierra Leone. At the same time, achieving the above objectives will depend critically on the level of security in the country. Hence, a robust military presence by the international community will remain essential for the foreseeable future. The Government of Sierra Leone, for its part must make full use of the security provided by the international community to fulfil its responsibilities in building, with the necessary outside assistance, the institutions and the capacity needed to extend and maintain its authority throughout the country. Ideally, the Mission's deployment to areas where currently no State administration is present should be preceded by the development of the Government's capacity to expeditiously extend its authority to those areas.

18. In accordance with resolution 1313 (2000), UNAMSIL would also be expected to continue to ensure its freedom of movement and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under threat of imminent physical violence.

19. In due course, the Government of Sierra Leone will have to assume full responsibility for its own security, since the international community's engagement cannot be open-ended. Therefore, the military training assistance provided to the armed forces of Sierra Leone by the United Kingdom and other Member States and the assistance provided by the Commonwealth for the training of the police force are to be welcomed. Offers of further assistance and equipment that would improve the operational capacity of Sierra Leone in this vital area would be of significant value.

### Mode of operation: progressive deployment

20. To achieve the objectives set out under the strengthened mandate proposed in resolution 1313 (2000), UNAMSIL would be required to deploy progressively in a coherent operational structure and in sufficient numbers and density. It is envisaged that each step of such deployment would take place after due consultation with all parties involved and a thorough analysis of the situation on the ground, the risks involved and the resources required to achieve clearly delineated operational objectives.

21. The deployment of troops would also be accompanied by coordinated political steps, involving the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS and the United Nations, as well as a well-designed public information campaign. The aim of such efforts would be to seek the compliance of rebel groups with the peace process and to encourage them to join the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. UNAMSIL would demonstrate its readiness to receive combatants who are genuinely willing to disarm and demobilize and to provide them with security. Obviously, RUF should be encouraged to disband its military capabilities as soon as possible and to transform itself into a genuine political party, which would show a tangible and credible commitment to democratic principles.

22. At the same time, UNAMSIL would remain vigilant and ready to respond immediately to any hostile action or threat as it deploys forward. Through the Mission's public information efforts, it should be made clear to all hostile armed groups that UNAMSIL, while fully committed to its peacekeeping objectives, has the means and determination to use force when attacked or challenged.

23. The Force would be organized to ensure that it is deployed at battalion strength in all but a few relatively secure locations. An effective mobile force reserve, close air support and other force multipliers, at strengths corresponding to the overall size and tasks of UNAMSIL, remain essential elements of the Force's structure. The UNAMSIL battalions would be expected to conduct assertive patrols and convoy escorts in order to provide an umbrella of security in the area where they are deployed. This requires that all battalions be fully equipped to United Nations standards to ensure mobility and force protection.

24. In accordance with the Mission's present mandate and rules of engagement, the use of force by UNAMSIL troops would be limited to the defence of its personnel, assets and mandate, including its freedom of movement and the protection of civilians, to the extent that it is capable of doing so and within its areas of deployment. At the same time, UNAMSIL would be expected to respond robustly to any action or to the threat of imminent use of force by hostile groups.

25. To enhance the security and effectiveness of UNAMSIL, it is important that Member States make available to the United Nations the any necessary information and intelligence assessments they may have related to the security of the Force on a confidential and continuous basis.

**Areas of deployment**

26. In accordance with resolution 1313 (2000), UNAMSIL would be required to deploy to the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas and major approach routes. A strong defence of those areas, which comprise the seat of Government and most government institutions, a large segment of the population and Sierra Leone's international seaport and airport, is a key element in deterring any hostile elements from pursuing the military option. This requires a strong presence on both peninsulas as well as full control over the main access routes. UNAMSIL already maintains a sizeable security presence in both peninsulas, as well at Masiaka, Rogberi Junction and Port Loko. However, to enhance the security of these areas, it would also be necessary to expand its presence towards Lunsar and Kambia.

27. Resolution 1313 (2000) also requires UNAMSIL to deploy to key strategic locations and main population centres, as well as to patrol actively along strategic lines of communication. In this regard, key areas could be defined as those located on the main roads leading from west to east. A northern road leads from Lungi to Koidu and a southern road from Freetown to Kailahun. These strategic roads also comprise main population centres and provincial capitals, such as Makeni, Bo and Kenema, and provide access to areas in the north and south of the country.

**Phases of deployment**

28. It is obvious that the forward deployment of UNAMSIL in strength would greatly depend on the resources and capabilities made available to it. The pace of deployment would also be dictated by the time of arrival of troops, their level of preparation and the situation on the ground. The deployment of UNAMSIL troops would therefore have to be carried out in phases.

**First phase**

29. As a first step, UNAMSIL would strengthen its presence at key locations in the west and east of the country by deploying two infantry battalions. The increase in strength would also be designed to enhance

the Mission's command and control and support structures through the deployment of the much-needed logistics and communication units, which would be attached to each sector and to the Force headquarters, as well as a helicopter transport unit, air-ground coordination units and intelligence and electronic operations. Moreover, UNAMSIL would strengthen its Force reserve and, in addition, a unit of armed patrol boats would be stationed in Freetown to monitor movement by sea and to prevent infiltration through the estuary near Freetown.

**Second phase**

30. Immediately upon completion of the above tasks, and provided the necessary resources are available, UNAMSIL would commence further progressive deployment. Depending on the conditions on the ground, including any requirements associated with the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, UNAMSIL would move gradually eastward, depending on a careful analysis of the situation on the ground, either on the northern axis to Makeni, Magburaka and Masingbi, or towards the border with Liberia, including the Kailahun area. This deployment would be undertaken in conjunction with the application of increased political and economic pressure on hostile groups on the ground.

31. For this phase, UNAMSIL would require three additional infantry battalions as well as additional headquarters personnel, support units and force multipliers. The total strength of the Force by the end of this phase would reach approximately 20,500 for all ranks, including a total of 18 infantry battalions. It is envisaged that the strength and tasks of the Mission's military observers and civilian police would remain unchanged.

**Subsequent phases**

32. Since it is envisaged in resolution 1313 (2000) that UNAMSIL, through its presence, would assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend State authority progressively throughout the entire country, the Force may also be required to deploy, in due course, to other key areas not currently under government control, including the main diamond-producing areas.

33. It is clear that the deployment of UNAMSIL in the first and second phases, as described above, would take some time. It would therefore be premature to assess in detail what United Nations resources might be required in Sierra Leone at that juncture. Several important factors, which cannot be measured at present, need to be borne in mind, in particular, the status of the peace process in Sierra Leone and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, the overall security environment and efforts to enhance regional stability, the progress made in training and restructuring the Sierra Leonean army, the development of government institutions to enable it to extend its authority effectively and the availability of troops contributed by Member States.

34. Should it become necessary to deploy in strength to other areas of the country, it is estimated that UNAMSIL might require 6 infantry battalions and the requisite support units, in addition to the 20,500 mentioned in paragraph 31 above. I intend to keep the force level of UNAMSIL under close review and to bring these and any other requirements to the attention of the Security Council as and when the need arises.

35. At the same time, it should be reiterated that the commitment of the international community to Sierra Leone cannot be open ended. Therefore, once the necessary security conditions have been put in place, it is expected that UNAMSIL would begin to hand over its security responsibilities to the armed and police forces of the Government, and gradually to reduce its strength.

## V. Force structure and organization

36. The proposed expansion of UNAMSIL, as described above, would enable it to strengthen its capabilities and ensure its sustainability. The Mission would retain its international character and would continue to operate under the command and control of the United Nations.

37. To maximize its effectiveness, the concept of operations of UNAMSIL should include the delegation of some elements of command and the capacity to conduct combined operations involving ground and air assets to brigade-sized components.

38. In view of the Mission's concept of operations as described above, the organization of the Force as well as its sectoral division of responsibilities should be kept flexible. A high degree of coordination between sectors will be required in order to prevent gaps

between tactical areas of deployment. Effective means of secure communication would be needed for this purpose.

39. UNAMSIL troops will also require special equipment that is not usually associated with traditional peacekeeping duties, such as surveillance and target-acquisition equipment, night vision equipment, laser range-finding and designation equipment, global positioning system equipment and radar to give it a 24-hour, all-weather capability. To summarize, the implementation of the mandate requires well-trained, fully equipped, well-led and motivated troops ready and willing to implement and defend the mandate entrusted to them.

## VI. Enhancing the effectiveness of the Mission

40. In its resolution 1313 (2000) the Security Council requested that further steps be taken to implement the recommendations to improve the performance and capacity of UNAMSIL made by the United Nations assessment mission that visited Sierra Leone from 31 May to 8 June 2000. In accordance with the findings of the assessment mission, UNAMSIL has continued to implement measures to enhance the cohesiveness of the command and control structure and also to improve its internal arrangements for the dissemination of information. In particular, the Mission has established a working group on policy and planning with the participation of military and civilian components of UNAMSIL. Also, cooperation and coordination with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations have been strengthened through regular meetings and the establishment of a civilian-military coordination cell to exchange and facilitate the flow of information with the humanitarian community.

41. To improve communication with the Sierra Leonean population and to properly address complaints, an Ombudsperson, whose terms of reference have already been developed, will be deployed to the Mission shortly. At the same time, to enhance the troops' understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement, UNAMSIL has set up a multidisciplinary group that is conducting orientation courses for all military personnel. The Mission has also prepared pocket-sized cards with information on the peacekeeper's code of conduct and the rules of engagement in all the languages used by the contingents.

## VII. Consultations with troop-contributing countries

42. On 16 August, the Secretariat convened a meeting of Member States contributing military and police personnel to UNAMSIL to brief their delegations on a preliminary concept of operations. During that meeting and in subsequent contacts with the Secretariat, several Member States made valuable comments and recommendations, which have been taken into account in preparing the present report.

43. On 23 August I convened a meeting at United Nations Headquarters of chiefs of defence staff of the countries currently participating with formed units in UNAMSIL. The purpose of the meeting was to enhance the Mission's cohesion and effectiveness. The meeting was characterized by an open and constructive discussion, which helped to achieve greater clarity about the mandate and tasks of UNAMSIL as well as the overall objectives of the international community in Sierra Leone, including the role of ECOWAS.

44. Delegations highlighted the responsibility of the entire international community for assisting UNAMSIL, through political and material support, to cope with the critical situation in Sierra Leone. They also expressed the view that the goal should be to arrive at a political solution in Sierra Leone, with the involvement of ECOWAS and the international community. They also underscored the importance of the commitment of the Government of Sierra Leone to do its utmost to stabilize the situation in the country.

45. Troop contributors pointed out that some of the tasks proposed for UNAMSIL would demand a very strong military peacekeeping presence with the necessary force multipliers, which should operate on the basis of a clearly defined and implementable mandate and realistic timeframes. Most delegations stressed that their contingents could not be expected to take part in a peace-enforcement operation.

46. Troop contributors agreed that every new stage of deployment, as described in the concept of operation above, should be preceded by a careful evaluation of the situation on the ground and the risks involved. Such

risks should be fully taken into account in the preparation of contingency plans.

47. In addressing the issue of command and control, the Secretary-General and heads of delegations stressed the need for UNAMSIL to function as a single integrated United Nations peacekeeping force, whose actions should be based on deterrence and robust rules of engagement. It was agreed that consultations with contributors on operational issues were indispensable but that they should not lead to delays in the execution of tasks or prevent the Mission from retaining the necessary operational flexibility.

## VII. Observations

48. In its resolution 1313 (2000) the Security Council indicated which priority tasks UNAMSIL was expected to perform in the near future as well as its intention to take a decision on the strengthening of the Mission's mandate and resources. I welcome this guidance by the Council and have given it careful consideration, after due consultation with troop-contributing countries.

49. Foremost in my mind is the plight of the people of Sierra Leone and the obvious harmful effects of the continuation of the Revolutionary United Front's hold over large parts of the country. It is imperative that the international community continue to bring economic and political as well as military pressure to bear on RUF and other hostile groups and to urge them to commit themselves fully to the peace process. In this regard, the security provided through the Mission's military presence remains an essential element of the peace process in Sierra Leone. I therefore recommend that the mandate of UNAMSIL, which expires on 8 September, be extended for a period of six months.

50. At the same time, to be able to perform its tasks, the strength of UNAMSIL should be significantly increased, as indicated by the Security Council in its resolution 1313 (2000). This would enable the Mission to enhance its operational structure and overall effectiveness and to deploy progressively forward in strength to key areas in Sierra Leone. I recommend, therefore, that the Council authorize an increase in the Mission's military strength to a level of 20,500 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to enable it to achieve the first two phases of forward deployment as described in section IV above. A report on the financial implications of such an increase will be issued shortly as an addendum to the present report.

51. In the present circumstances, I believe that the Mission's priority tasks, as indicated in resolution 1313 (2000), can largely be achieved under its current mandate, based on resolutions 1270 (1999) and 1289 (2000), and robust rules of engagement, provided, of course, that the Mission receives the necessary resources and support from Member States. I intend, in this regard, to keep the security, political and humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone under close review, and would not hesitate to revert to the Security Council, after due consultations with troop-contributing countries, with any additional recommendations, including the possibility of further strengthening the Force and/or its mandate, should this be required to reach the international community's objectives in Sierra Leone.

52. The presence of a robust and determined peacekeeping force in the country, as described above, should be part of a strategy to induce armed groups to disarm, in combination with strong incentives for their reintegration into Sierra Leonean society. I welcome, therefore, the efforts undertaken by the Governments of Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom, the World Bank and other international partners of the United Nations to breathe new life into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. It is particularly important that a wide range of reintegration and reconciliation projects be prepared urgently to offer all combatants the opportunity of a new and more constructive life.

53. I also urge the Government of Sierra Leone to continue, with the assistance of donor countries, to develop and implement its plans for the extension of its authority throughout the country and to consolidate its administration as soon as possible. This, needless to say, would greatly facilitate the work of UNAMSIL.

54. Of particular importance is the urgent development of Sierra Leone's capacity to ensure its own security. The current training assistance provided to the Sierra Leonean army and police forces under the leadership of the United Kingdom should be welcomed, and I hope that other Member States will join in this crucial effort.

55. In view of the proposed increase in the United Nations military presence in Sierra Leone, I call upon Member States, in particular those able to provide

specialized support units, to give consideration to participating in UNAMSIL. These indispensable units should be fully prepared and equipped to function under United Nations command in the difficult and volatile environment of Sierra Leone. Assistance from Member States that have the capacity to train, equip or provide other support to current and future UNAMSIL troops will also be crucial. The support that the United States of America has recently indicated it would provide to troops from West African countries, which would be earmarked to serve with UNAMSIL, is therefore a particularly welcome step.

56. The present report is being issued shortly after the publication of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809). In a sense, the course taken by the Security Council, Member States and the Secretariat with regard to the situation in Sierra Leone represents an important first test of our joint responsibility to implement the practical recommendations made by the Panel, with a view to making the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace.

57. Finally, I should like to take this opportunity to once again express my deep appreciation to those Member States which currently contribute military personnel and civilian police to UNAMSIL for their indispensable and continued support while the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone went through very difficult times. I should also like to express my deep appreciation to the men and women serving with UNAMSIL and other United Nations agencies in Sierra Leone for carrying out their tasks under extremely dangerous and challenging conditions.

# Annex

## United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions as at 22 August 2000

| | *Military observers* | *Staff officers* | *Troops* | *Sector headquarters staff* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bangladesh | 12 | 4 | 776 | | 792 |
| Bolivia | 4 | | | | 4 |
| Canada | 5 | | | | 5 |
| China | 6 | | | | 6 |
| Croatia | 10 | | | | 10 |
| Czech Republic | 5 | | | | 5 |
| Denmark | 2 | | | | 2 |
| Egypt | 10 | | | | 10 |
| France | 3 | | | | 3 |
| Gambia | 26 | | | | 26 |
| Ghana | 4 | 5 | 769 | | 778 |
| Guinea | 12 | 2 | 775 | | 789 |
| India | 14 | 30 | 2 986 | 43 | 3 073 |
| Indonesia | 10 | | | | 10 |
| Jordan | 5 | 8 | 1 768 | 49 | 1 830 |
| Kenya | 11 | 13 | 815 | 50 | 889 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 2 | | | | 2 |
| Malaysia | 10 | | | | 10 |
| Mali | 8 | | | | 8 |
| Nepal | 6 | | | | 6 |
| New Zealand | 2 | | | | 2 |
| Nigeria | 4 | 14 | 3 144 | 43 | 3 205 |
| Norway | 5 | | | | 5 |
| Pakistan | 10 | | | | 10 |
| Russian Federation | 15 | 2 | 110 | | 127 |
| Slovakia | 2 | | | | 2 |
| Sweden | 3 | | | | 3 |
| Thailand | 5 | | | | 5 |
| United Kingdom | 15 | | | | 15 |
| United Republic of Tanzania | 12 | | | | 12 |
| Uruguay | 11 | | | | 11 |
| Zambia | 11 | 3 | 774 | | 788 |
| **Total** | **260** | **81** | **11 917** | **185** | **12 443** |

Civilian police: Bangladesh, 4; Gambia, 2; Ghana, 3; India, 1; Jordan, 3; Kenya, 3; Malaysia, 3; Namibia, 1; Nepal, 5; Norway, 2; Senegal, 5; Zimbabwe, 2. Total: 34.




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